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Abstract Experimental subjects usually self-select to the laboratory and this
may introduce a bias to the derived conclusions. We analyze data stored by
a subject-pool management software at an experimental laboratory and spec-
ulate about the effect of individual decisions on returning. In particular, we
test whether experience and earnings in previous sessions together with de-
mographic variables explain the decision to return to the laboratory. We find
that males and (in monetary terms) well-performing subjects are more likely
to participate again in experiments.
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The purpose of laboratory experiments is to test hypotheses in a controlled
environment. However, the composition of the subject pool stays often out of
the experimenter’s control and its characteristics rarely enter the statistical
analysis of experimental data.
Subject pools used in economic experiments typically consist of college
students who are usually recruited online or on campus on a voluntary basis
to participate. In other words, they self-select to the laboratory and this may
introduce a bias to the conclusions. In this note, we study the evolution of
the subject pool at a specific experimental laboratory and speculate about its
consequences.
In a related study, Andersen et al. (2009) argue that the subject pool in
the laboratory may not constitute a representative sample of the broader pop-
ulation and call for complementary field experiments.1 Harrison et al. (2009)
analyze the problem of self-selection into experiments using both laboratory
and field experiments. They observe that by changing the reward scheme, the
constitution of the subject pool also changes (e.g., the proportion of risk-averse
subjects). Rutström (1998) makes a similar conclusion using data from lab-
oratory experiments on the Vickrey and the English auctions. These studies
open an important line of research concerned with the basic rules of running
laboratory experiments.
We consider administrative data from the recruitment system of an exper-
imental laboratory located at a university in the Northeastern United States.
The database contains individual participation and earnings histories along
with some demographic information. We use simple statistical and economet-
ric tools to analyze subjects’ decision to return to the laboratory by treating
it as a function of variables like gender, age, experience and previous earnings.
We find a significant positive effect of previous earnings and age in ex-
plaining the probability of coming back to the laboratory. On the other hand,
experience seems to have a significant negative effect. Although significant,
these effects tend to be small. Interestingly being a male student at Boston
University or Harvard and majoring in social sciences increase the odds of
returning to the laboratory where our data have been recorded. The effect
of these characteristics cannot be considered negligible as each increases the
odds of returning to the laboratory by a factor between 14 and 26 percentual
points.
The effect of studying at Boston University and at Harvard can be traced
back to their proximity to the experimental laboratory. The effect of social
sciences might be explained by the fact that the word “economics” is often
used in the recruitment material and this may bias the sample towards students
with an interest in the field. Interestingly, even if we control for the other
characteristics, it turns out that males are more prone to return.
1 They consider experiments to elicit preference heterogeneity and claim that “the lab
might not be the best place to search for demographic effects”.
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The abundance of male experimental subjects might introduce a serious
bias. A recent study by Croson and Gneezy (2008) surveys research on gender
differences in risk aversion, social preferences and preference towards compe-
tition. They claim that women tend to be more risk averse, act according
to social cues rather than principles when facing social dilemmas and dislike
competition.
2 Descriptives
Our data set consists of 8,755 observations. Each of them represents a subject’s
participation in an experimental session. Our analysis covers a total of 2,408
subjects who participated in 597 experimental sessions corresponding to 74
different studies. All the data come from the same laboratory located at a
university in the Northeastern United States. We use entries recorded after
April, 2003, because that is the month when the laboratory started gathering
participants’ personal data on a regular basis. The latest observations included
in this analysis were gathered in January, 2006. The available data include
various self-reported personal characteristics of the subjects, including their
gender, age, and the university (if any) they are affiliated with, along with
their earnings in the experiment.
In some experiments, subjects’ payment does not depend, or depends very
little, on the subjects’ behavior. Since our objective is to study economic exper-
iments where monetary incentives are the norm, we have deleted observations
from sessions with fixed payments or in which payments do not vary much.
We excluded all the sessions in which 80 percent or more of the participants
received the same amount of money.2 We have not discovered important qual-
itative changes in the results when performing the same analysis using cutoffs
of 50 percent, 90 percent and 100 percent, instead of 80 percent.3 We have
also deleted records with zero registered payment, and repeated entries, keep-
ing the one with the highest payment.4 These two categories are a result of
faulty data entries: no subject actually received zero payment, and no subject
was paid more than once for the same participation. We found a total of 176
zero entries and 277 repeated entries. This leaves 8,755 observations in the
data set.5
2 This selection is in line with the philosophy of regression analysis we perform on the data,
since ignoring fixed and quasi-fixed payments guarantees larger variance in the dependent
variable. As a result, we effectively exclude most tournament experiments, and also those
sessions with fixed payments in which a few of the subjects earned more money, due to
the “early show-up fee” that rewards people who arrive at experiments early with an extra
payment.
3 The excluded observations belong to participants who on average earned almost $4 less
than the included ones. They also tend to be older (by 0.78 years) and are more likely to
be college students (by 2.3% points).
4 We enquired and found that lower payments usually correspond to show-up fees.
5 The laboratory has recently started collecting information on subjects’ ethnic group. As
there are only 4,559 (52.97%) entries that contain a value for this variable, in order to not
reduce the number of observations in the analysis we decided not to include this variable
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Apart from the recorded personal data such as age, gender, racial group,
educational level (with intended major and the name of the college), and the
basic characteristics of the experimental session (final payment, experiment
id), we also created several variables for the empirical analysis. Of the 2,408
subjects in the data, 70 percent came more than once to the laboratory over
the course of the period we investigate. In order to control for experience, i.e.
training in experiments, we have constructed three variables. EXP T counts
the total number of occasions the subject appears in the database prior to the
experimental session in question. EXP I counts only experiments that make
the 80 percent cutoff described earlier. The third experience variable, EXP A,
is dichotomous and takes the value 1 if the subject appears in the database
prior to the given record, and 0 otherwise. It turns out that subjects who
participate in experiments have a long experience record: At the time of our
analysis they have participated in more than 6 sessions on average (in almost
5 if we solely consider incentives based experiments). This number is in line
with the usual concern on the validity of experimental results as explained by
List and Levitt (2006) who discuss the problem of subjects’ self-selection into
experiments.
As for the return decisions themselves, the variables RET 30/60/90/365
take value 1 if the subject returns to participate in an experiment in the
subsequent 30, 60, 90 and 365 days, respectively. In order to eliminate the
survivorship bias from our analysis we excluded the observations from the
last 30, 60, 90 and 365 days in the analysis, respectively, given that we can
not know whether those observation belong to a subject who wishes to (and
actually does) return to the laboratory in the future or not.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics on all the variables included in our
analysis for the whole sample and also for two subsamples. We call “newcom-
ers” all those participants who has no experience with incentive-based experi-
ments, while we refer to those who have participated in more than 27 sessions
as “experts”. The latter set of observations constitutes 1% of the entries with
the most experience. The picture that this table reflects is typical for labora-
tory experiments in economics. The vast majority of the subjects are college
students (74 percent), and almost 82 percent have experience in experiments
by the time of participation. The largest share comes from the area of social
sciences, though other specialities such as humanities or natural sciences are
also well represented. Participants earn roughly $24 on average. The distribu-
tion of payments is positively skewed as income distributions tend to be. Its
variance is large, with a standard deviation is approximately $9. The subject
pool of the experimental laboratory that we study seems to be well-trained, as
subjects have experience from more than six experiments on average (almost
five if we consider only incentive-based sessions).
in the final data set. If we compare the mean payoffs across the nine ethnic groups using
analysis of variance (ANOVA) tables we cannot reject the null hypothesis of them being
equal. The p-value in this case is of 0.14.
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Table 1 Subject descriptives. Newcomers: subjects with no experience in incentive-based
experiments. Experts: subjects with experience of more than 27 incentive-based experiments.
characteristics variable newcomers all experts
age AGE 23.03 23.56 35.86
gender MALE
female 48.59 44.81 19.05
male 41.69 46.61 64.29
n/a 9.72 8.58 16.67
education
some high school E1 0.26 0.27 0.00
high school diploma E2 8.93 7.86 0.00
some college E3 53.13 52.27 9.52
associate level degree E4 0.73 0.51 0.00
bachelor level degree E5 16.51 18.52 17.86
other masters E6 6.37 6.72 20.24
MBA E7 0.31 1.11 0.00
doctoral level degree E8 0.94 1.28 19.05
n/a 12.80 11.47 33.33
college
other U1 4.60 3.86 0.00
Univ. of Massachusetts U2 0.47 0.95 27.38
Tufts University U3 2.04 2.44 8.33
Northeastern University U4 1.52 2.22 0.00
Boston College U5 0.73 0.62 0.00
Boston University U6 11.13 12.26 20.24
Harvard University U7 46.92 47.64 0.00
MIT U8 4.70 4.05 0.00
n/a 27.90 25.96 55.95
major
natural sciences M1 13.27 12.51 0.00
social sciences M2 30.25 32.24 0.00
engineering M3 4.65 5.15 20.24
humanities M4 12.33 11.98 9.52
other M5 3.97 4.20 17.86
n/a 31.71 30.47 52.38
earnings EARN 23.21 23.80 22.79
experience
any EXP A 0.20 0.82 1.00
incentives EXP I 0.00 4.80 32.99
total EXP T 0.20 6.47 42.10
return
in 30 days RET 30 0.47 0.57 0.56
in 60 days RET 60 0.53 0.64 0.80
in 90 days RET 90 0.55 0.67 0.84
in 365 days RET 365 0.68 0.82 1.00
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Table 2 Logit regression analysis of return decisions (part 1).
RET 30 RET 60 RET 90 RET 365
EARN 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗
AGE 2.22∗∗∗ 2.76∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗ 2.72
AGE2 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.03
EXP I −0.43∗∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ −2.12∗∗∗
EXP I2 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
control subject subject subject subject
pseudo−R2 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.61
3 Return decisions
One would expect a high correlation between the fact of being a student and
the decision of returning to the laboratory on a voluntary basis. Pearson’s χ2
confirms such a positive relationship at any usual significance level, however
the values of Cramer’s V statistics around 10% indicate that the association is
very low.6 It is equal to 10.63%, 10.52%, 10.02%, and 12.94% for the variables
RET 30/60/90 and 365 respectively.
We ran logit regressions with subject-specific fixed effects in order to ex-
plain the decision of returning to the experimental laboratory in the next
30, 60, 90 and 365 days with personal characteristics.7 Table 2 shows the es-
timation and the related test results. Experience and earnings from previous
experiments along with the subject’s age have a significant effect on the return
decisions. Experience affects the odds of returning to the laboratory negatively,
while age and earnings affect it positively.8
Previous earnings unsurprisingly incentivize subjects to return to the labo-
ratory (the odds of returning are 1-2% higher for every dollar earned previously
in the lab).9 However, it seems that participating in experiments is not ad-
dictive, since the odds of repeating decreases with experience. The relatively
large positive effect of age may be funded on two pillars. On one hand, while
college students often instinctively decide to enter the laboratory encouraged
by randomly posted adds on campus, older participants tend to look for ex-
periments and therefore be “more frequent guests”. As List and Levitt (2006)
argue, subjects self-select into experiments, and therefore people who are more
interested in the announced research topic are more likely to participate. On
6 With usual, we refer to significance levels between 1% and 10%.
7 We estimate logit models, because we wish to study subject-related fixed effects both
in the return decisions and in individual earnings from experiments. As Wooldridge (2002)
points out, the unobserved-effect logit model has an important advantage over the probit,
because a consistent estimator can be obtained without any assumption about how the
unobserved effects are related to the observed ones.
8 The sign of the above-mentioned effects is unambiguous on the domain of our database
in which age ranges from 18 to 73, while experience in incentive-based experiments from 0
to 43.
9 In the interpretation of the logit coefficients we use that a small change in the logarithm
of a variable (now the odds ratio) is approximately its percentage change.
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Table 3 Logit regression analysis of return decisions (part 2).
RET 30
EARN 0.01∗∗∗ EARN 0.01∗∗∗ EARN 0.01∗∗∗
AGE −0.06∗∗∗ AGE −0.08∗∗∗ AGE −0.05∗∗∗
AGE2 0.00∗∗ AGE2 0.00∗∗∗ AGE2 0.00∗∗
EXP I 0.06∗∗∗ EXP I 0.06∗∗∗ EXP I 0.06∗∗∗
EXP I2 −0.00∗∗∗ EXP I2 −0.00∗∗∗ EXP I2 −0.00∗∗∗
MALE 0.14∗∗∗ MALE 0.13∗∗∗ MALE 0.13∗∗
U1 0.14 − −0.66 M1 0.11
U2 −0.34 E2 −0.70 M2 0.20∗∗
U3 0.02 E3 −0.62 M3 −0.01
U4 0.07 E4 −0.71 M4 0.11
U5 0.22 E5 −0.60 M5 −0.06
U6 0.26∗∗∗ E6 −0.36 − −
U7 0.18∗∗ E7 −0.48 − −
U8 −0.03 E8 − − −
const. 0.67∗∗ const. 1.95∗∗∗ const. 0.65∗
control − control − control −
pseudo−R2 0.01 pseudo−R2 0.01 pseudo−R2 0.01
the other hand, also causality in the opposite direction may hide behind this
significant effect, given that those who return in the future are necessarily
older.
It is interesting that the significant effect of earning and age tend to fade
away the longer we look into the future for return decisions. The increasing
goodness-of-fit of the model suggests that short-term decisions are more ran-
dom than long-term ones. The rather small values also indicate that decisions
are largely influenced by factors that lie out of the scope of our analysis.
The regression models with subject-specific fixed effects have a large num-
ber of dummy variables and do not allow for studying whether gender, college,
education level or intended major have any significant effect on the return de-
cisions. This is why, table 3 reports estimation results for “simple” logit models
that include these as regressors to explain RET 30.10 Although our database
is relatively large, it does not allow for including all these dummy variables in
the same model.
Males tend to return to the laboratory more frequently than females (the
odds of returning are 13-14% higher for males than females). The location
of the experimental laboratory relative to BU and Harvard seem to have a
significant effect too. Education level does not seem to be an important deter-
minant. Nevertheless students of social sciences return more likely than others
(their odds of returning are 20% higher). In the logit estimates in table 3 the
variables related to age and previous experience have the opposite sign when
compared to the results in table 2. While the latter can be interpreted on an
individual level (“as subjects grow older and gain more experience...”), the
10 The regressors have similar explanatory power in explaining the other return decisions,
therefore those estimation results are omitted.
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Table 4 OLS regression analysis of earnings (part 1).
EARN
EARN MIN 0.66∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ − 0.35∗∗∗
EARN MAX 0.22∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ − 0.22∗∗∗
AGE −0.10∗∗ −0.48 −0.11 −0.12∗
AGE2 0.00∗ 0.01 0.00 0.00
EXP I 0.07∗∗∗ −0.09 0.05 0.05∗
EXP I2 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
const. 5.90∗∗∗ 7.87 25.65∗∗∗ 12.19∗∗∗
control − subject session experiment
adj −R2 0.19 0.37 0.42 0.41
former capture population effects (“older subjects and subjects with experi-
ence...”). That is, older subjects are less likely to return and those who has
participated in experiments before tend to do return.
4 Earnings
Personal earnings in experiments have a significant positive effect on the deci-
sion of returning to the lab. This section examines whether personal character-
istics have any explanatory power in the determination of these experimental
earnings. We use regression analysis to separate the effects that these variables
might have.
On top of these demographic variables we include the minimum (EARN MIN)
and the maximum (EARN MAX) payment in the session. These two variables
control for subjects’ motivation induced by the payments themselves. For ex-
ample, when payments are too low, subjects may not take as much care in
their decision making.
Table 4 shows the estimation results for linear regression models with ro-
bust variance estimates that explain the observed variation in real money
earnings. We use the standard ordinary least squares method (OLS) to esti-
mate the coefficients. In order to account for unobservable subject, session or
experiment-related effects we studied several specifications of our regression
model including the so-called fixed effects.
It seems that personal earnings are mainly determined by the rules set by
the experimenter, i.e. the minimum and the maximum payment in the session,
and by variables other than the here included demographic ones. This is in
line with the philosophy of incentives-based economic experimental studies
that usually assume that earning do not differ across demographic groups, but
do vary with individual behavior and decisions that escape from the scope of
our analysis. Probably this explains why the goodness-of-fit of these models is
below 50%.
When significant, age effects the earnings negatively, while experience does
so positively. As for the qualitative variables, males tend to earn more than
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Table 5 OLS regression analysis earnings (part 2).
EARN
AGE −0.10 AGE −0.14 AGE −0.05
AGE2 0.00 AGE2 0.00 AGE2 0.00
EXP I 0.04 EXP I 0.03 EXP I 0.05
EXP I2 −0.00 EXP I2 −0.00 EXP I2 −0.00
MALE 0.22 MALE 0.27 MALE 0.35∗∗
U1 0.34 − − M1 0.36
U2 0.20 E2 0.12 M2 0.35
U3 0.44 E3 0.38 M3 0.22
U4 0.19 E4 0.18 M4 −0.13
U5 0.77 E5 0.33 M5 0.52
U6 0.07 E6 0.58 − −
U7 0.38 E7 0.50 − −
U8 1.03∗∗ E8 −0.13 − −
const. 25.04∗∗∗ const. 25.78∗∗∗ const. 24.46∗∗∗
control session control session control session
adj −R2 0.41 adj −R2 0.41 adj −R2 0.42
females, and so do MIT students than their colleagues from other universi-
ties.11 The model specifications (that include information on college, educa-
tional level or major) behind the results in table 5 assume session-specific fixed
effect, therefore the session minimum and maximum are excluded from the re-
gressor list. Remarkably, only two of the analyzed factors appear to have a
significant (positive) effect on earnings: gender and studying at MIT.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis on return decisions to the experimental laboratory discovers that
although demographic variables have little effect on individual decisions, males
and (in monetary terms) well-performing subjects are more likely to return.
That is, we have found some evidence of “lab rats” being raised. Research on
gender differences has already put the distinct attitudes towards risk, social
preferences and competition into spotlight (e.g. Croson and Gneezy, 2008).
Hence the fact male subjects return more often to the lab may introduce some
behavioral bias. Likewise, it is possible that subjects who are more familiar
with the laboratory environment and have been performing well in the past
may behave in a different way when compared to unexperienced subjects.
However our data does not contain precise information about behavior in a
particular experiments. We observe only earnings, therefore we cannot be more
assertive. In order to overcome this caveat, demographic information should be
routinely and systematically collected in experimental laboratories across the
world. Even more, precise information about the type of experiments should be
11 Although the regressor for gender is not significant in the first two specification the
p-values are not far from the usual 10% by being equal to 18% and 11%.
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stored and made widely available.12 By doing that, the effect of subject pools
on experimental results could be studied more precisely than it is done in
our exercise, and future analysis could compare different subjects pools, males
with females, students with non-students in numerous experimental settings.
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